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Empowering Subprime Borrowers:
Mandatory Unsecured Credit Payoffs as
Finance Charges
STEVEN

R. SHARPE*

INTRODUCTION

Predatory lending law combines imprecise, policy-driven standards with technical,
closely crafted regulations.' This discussion touches on both the theoretical and
technical aspects of the law. In the narrow context, this Note argues that when a lender
forces a borrower to pay off unsecured, third-party loans as a condition of receiving a
refinanced or home equity mortgage loan, the amount of that payoff should count as a
finance charge. In the broad context, it arrives at this conclusion by illustrating a
connection between predatory lending statutes. This connection is significant, as
2
predatory tactics remain prevalent in an expanding subprime market.
3
Mortgage debt is a risky undertaking that changes borrowers' lives. Despite the risk
inherent in mortgage lending, especially for those with poor credit histories,4 borrowers

*J.D. Candidate, 2005, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 2002,
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. I would like to thank Professor Sarah Jane Hughes for
sharpening my ideas; her help was invaluable. Moreover, Jamie Andree, Marcy Wenzler, and all
the people at Indiana Legal Services-Bloomington provided incredible insight into predatory
lending law, as did Jim Sugarman from the AARP. Professor Dee Pridgen's comments and
suggestions also proved to be vital. Special thanks to Ursula for everything and to my family for
their constant support.
1. For a discussion of the Federal Trade Commission's unfairness standard, see infra
notes 23-39 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the recent predatory lending statutes
and federal regulations, see infra notes 129-159 and accompanying text.
2. Subprime borrowers are those who, due to income uncertainty, blemished credit, or
no credit, are not eligible for a conventional loan package. "Subprime loans are significantly
more expensive than prime loans to borrowers, both in terms of interest rates and points and
fees." Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: PredatoryLending, Securitization,andthe Holder
in Due Course Doctrine,35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503, 573 (2002).
The subprime market has grown at a faster rate than the remainder of the lending
market. Id. at 576. "Between 1993 and 1998, subprime mortgage refinancing grew from fewer
than 100,000 loans to more than 800,000, while refinancing from prime lenders barely
increased." Id. (citation omitted).
3. Professor Willis R. Bryant, in his mid-century guide for mortgage lenders, acutely
captures the import of mortgage lending: "An application for a home loan is usually the largest
financial undertaking in the life of the average homeowner, and great care must be exercised in
WILs R. BRYANT, MORTGAGE LENDING
analyzing the financial aspects of the transaction .
95-96 (2d ed. 1962).
4. The drastic increase in foreclosure rates, especially in the subprime lending market,
illustrates the dangers inherent in mortgage lending. See Janet Kidd Stewart, Costly Loans Fuel
ForeclosureWave: Study Says Filings Up 74% in 8 Years; MinoritiesHit Hard,CHI. TRin., Feb.
27, 2003, at N1 (discussing the 500% increase in foreclosures in Chicago's subprime market);
see also Kristina Shevory, More Homeowners Selling Houses for Less than They Owe;
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still disregard some mortgage charges. Even an additional $200 added to a refinanced
mortgage debt causes a large financial impact. Over a thirty-year term, an added $200
will quadruple if financed at a 15% fixed annual rate.5 Borrowers should analyze
closely any practice that adds even a seemingly insignificant sum to the mortgage debt.
When a lender forces a borrower to pay off small, third-party debts as a condition of
receiving credit, 6 the additional charge may seem negligible in comparison to other
mortgage charges, such as interest. The lender will give the borrower capital to pay off
other creditors, and this relatively small sum is then consolidated into the much larger
mortgage principal. 7 Although the lender forces the payoff, some borrowers do not
challenge the requirement, finding that this requirement makes their credit payments
more convenient. Instead of writing checks to several different lenders, the mortgagor
need only pay the mortgagee.
These seemingly innocuous payoffs, however, convert the mortgagor's unsecured
and often unfinanced debts into financed debts secured to her home. 8 As illustrated
below, this conversion places9 a hefty burden on the borrower that outweighs the
benefits of loan consolidation.
Mortgage Delinquencies Have Risen Dramatically; 'People Are in over Their Heads' with
Payments, SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 7,2003, at Al, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Seattm File;
Jim Weiker, Pace Quickens on Foreclosures; Ohio Rate Nearly Tops in Nation; Economy,
Lending HabitsBlamed, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 25,2003, at ID, availableat LEXIS, News

Library, Coldis File; see generally Letter from Margot Saunders, Managing Attorney, National
Consumer Law Center, to the Honorable Michael Oxley, Financial Services Committee
Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives and the Honorable Barney Frank, Financial Services
Committee Ranking Member, U.S. House of Representatives (Dec. 1, 2003) (discussing the
foreclosure rate caused by subprime mortgages), at
increasing national
http://www.consumerlaw.org/initiatives/predatory-mortgage/oxley-etter.shtml.
5. Fifteen percent is not an uncommon interest rate in the subprime market. See
generally CONSUMERS UNION, ELDERLY IN THE SuBPRIME MARKET 3-4 (2002) (recounting as
normal cases in which one person in the subprime market had a 14% interest rate and another
had a rate of almost 16%), at http://www.consumersunion.orgpdf/elderly-sub.pdf. The total
payment for an additional $200 is $903.20:
Amount Added to Principle
$200 at 15% annual rate

Total Interest
$703.20

Total Payment
$903.20

6. I am thinking of debts such as cell phone bills, utility bills, and small judgments.
While these debts are not small to those who cannot pay them off, they do not compare in
magnitude with mortgage debt.
7. For a discussion concerning the common traits of forced credit payoffs, including
the consolidation of the payoff sums with the borrower's mortgage debt, see infra note 11. In
some instances, of course, the borrower can simply pay the debts without the lender's help;
therefore, the payoff amount is not consolidated onto the debt. But as my discussion with Jim
Sugarman suggests, see infra note 11, this self-payoff does not often occur in the subprime
market because of the borrower's limited finances.
8. Credit card payoffs provide a typical example of a forced payoff of afinanceddebt.
Even though some of the unfairness arguments this Note presents only apply to the payoff of
unfinanced debt, it still asserts that forced payoffs of financed debt are unfair because the payoff
transforms the unsecured debt into a secured debt. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying
text. Importantly, the scope of my argument is limited to small credit card payoffs.
9. See infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, these costly payoffs are common. The National Consumer Law
Center's Truth in Lending notes: "It is fairly common for creditors to require that the
10
consumer pay other debts as a condition of obtaining the loan." Lenders in the
subprime market often require these payoffs before they will refinance a mortgage or
sell a home equity loan." Due to the financial harm this common practice causes
borrowers, advocates should consider remedies available in federal consumer
protection statutes.
This Note contends that federal law can provide a remedial course for subprime
borrowers forced to pay off unsecured third-party debts as a condition of a refinanced
or home equity mortgage loan. In order to simplify the discussion, these forced payoffs
are called "unsecured credit payoffs" throughout the Note. 12 The argument proceeds as
follows: (1) Unsecured credit payoffs fit the definition of an "unfair trade practice"
13
under the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Act; (2) because the FTC has not
regulated this practice and because the FTC Act provides no private avenue to remedy
4
the unfairness, borrowers should seek a remedy in other statutes;' (3) an unsecured
credit payoff fits the statutory definition of a finance charge under the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA") (by classifying the payoff sum as a
HOEPA finance charge, a court could supply an avenue to remedy the unfairness;

10. ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER,
TRUTH IN LENDING, § 3.6.1.2, at 88 (4th ed. 1999).
11. According to Jim Sugarman, an attorney with the AARP's Legal Counsel for the
Elderly:
Most of my clients are required to pay off even their unsecured consumer debts
The borrower is not informed which debts are being paid
with a refinance loan ....
until those debts are listed on the HUD-1 settlement statement ....If they do
know that other debts are being paid, they are told that this debt consolidation is in
their financial interest.
E-mail from Jim Sugarman, Legal Counsel, AARP, to Steven R. Sharpe (Nov. 19, 2003,
10:35:19 EST) (on file with author). Commentators have also noted the common nature of this
practice in the refinancing context. See Odette Williamson, Protecting Elderly Homeowners
from Predatory Mortgage Lenders, 34 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 297, 302 (2000) (discussing
"refinancing unsecured debt" as a common predatory lending practice). For a description of the
subprime market, see supra note 2.
The lender's actions at issue in Thorp Loan & Thrift Co. v. Buckles (In re Buckles), 189 B.R.

752 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995), illustrate how borrowers end up making these payoffs. Although
the borrower in Buckles never contemplated paying off her JC Penney's account through her
mortgage, the lender found out about the preexisting debt through a questionnaire. Id. at 756.
"[The lender] induced the Debtor to agree to obtaining this component of the advance; the
Debtor did not ask for it, and had never contemplated receiving it." Id. at 757.
12. I also employ the term "unsecured credit payoffs" to distinguish between credit
payoffs that do not involve collateral, which are the subject of this Note, and payoffs in which
the lender forces the payment of third-party liens on the collateral. The latter type of credit
payoffs is not considered unfair and is not considered a "finance charge" under the federal
regulations. Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1990).
13. See infra notes 40-113 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 113-24 and accompanying text.
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however, courts have not yet addressed this issueS); (4) the unremedied unfairness (as
defined by the FTC Act) that borrowers forced into unsecured credit payoffs face
should provide judges a sufficient policy incentive to classify the payoffs as HOEPA
finance charges;16 and (5)therefore, the HOEPA framework
can provide the borrower
7
a private remedial course that the FTC Act lacks,'
The HOEPA-FTC Act link illustrated in this Note has relevance beyond unsecured
credit payoffs. Plaintiffs in other contexts can utilize the strong connections between
HOEPA and the FTC Act in order to strengthen their predatory lending claims.
Accepting this argument, however, will not lead to a slippery slope where all
potentially unfair practices will produce finance charges. Unsecured credit payoffs
already meet the definition of a finance charge. The HOEPA-FTC Act argument
simply provides judges with an incentive to follow the definition in the absence of any
on-point precedent.
I. UNSECURED CREDIT PAYOFFS-A HYPOTHETICAL

To illustrate the impact of unsecured credit payoffs, this Note employs a
hypothetical situation drawn from an actual case.
Ms. Smith, a sixty-year-old woman, decided to refinance her mortgage. She had
held an 8% fixed-interest loan. However, after refinancing her mortgage, her interest
rate climbed to 13%. Moreover, as a condition of the refinancing, the lender forced her
to pay off a $600 wireless phone bill, a $200 judgment debt,18 and a $200 electricity
bill. The lender consolidated these amounts into her debt after paying off her creditors.
Each debt was previously unfinanced and unsecured. 19 This Note employs this fact
pattern below in order to illustrate the unfair elements of unsecured credit payoffs.

15. See infra notes 129-91 and accompanying text. Much, if not all, of the argument
presented should apply to the characterization of unsecured credit payoffs in non-HOEPA Truth

in Lending actions, especially in the mortgage lending context. See supra notes 129-32 and
accompanying text. Because this Note focuses solely on subprime mortgage lending, however,
the discussion will be limited to HOEPA.
16. See infra notes 192-213 and accompanying text. I am not arguing that fees
charged in connection with the payment of a loan, like a prepayment penalty, should count as a
finance charge. See Stutman v. Chemical Bank, 94 Civ. 5013 (MBM), 1996 WL 539845
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1996) (finding that a prepayment penalty is not a finance charge).
17. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. It is important to note, however, that
the FTC could always remedy the unfairness under its enforcement power under the FTC Act.
As I noted, the agency has not considered unsecured credit payoffs.
18. In this case, the woman paid off this debt despite being judgment-proof. In
Indiana, a judgment creditor automatically gains a lien on the debtor's real property once the
decision is docketed. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-55-9-2 (1998); see also 46 AM. JUR. 2d
Judgments § 371 (1994) ("A judgment lien ordinarily is not a lien on any specific real estate of
the judgment debtor but is a general lien on all of the debtor's real property."). However,
because Ms. Smith did not hold non-exempt equity in her real property (or any other nonexempt property), according to the Indiana exemption statute, IND. CODE § 34-55-10-2 (1998),
the judgment creditor could not recover that $200 debt. Yet, she still was forced to pay off the
$200.
19. This summary is simplified in order to facilitate easy calculation. The actual facts
of this case are much worse. The prime borrower in the actual case did not owe the debt;
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II. THE UNFAIRNESS OF UNSECURED CREDIT PAYOFFS
A. The FTCAct and the FTC's Policy Against Unfair Practices

20
In 1938, Congress broadened the scope of the FTC Act, a statute that provides
government agencies the power to punish entities engaged in illegitimate commercial
practices. Prior to the 1938 amendment, the FTC Act invalidated only "unfair methods
2
of competition." ' The revised statute made "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
22
and affecting commerce" unlawful.
The FTC Act evaluates potential "unfair" acts using a different standard than the
2 3
one used to evaluate potentially "deceptive" acts. In other words, an agency may find
a practice unfair but not deceptive. This Note is concerned only with the scope of the

24

unfairness standard.
Congress split the regulatory power of the FTC Act among several governmental
bodies. It provided the Federal Trade Commission the chief authority to punish entities
engaged in unfair trade practices. The legislature, however, reserved the power to
curb unfair practices in the banking industry to the federal agencies that regulate
adjudicates the unfairness of a practice,
banks.26 Moreover, after the relevant agency
27
the defendant may appeal in federal court.

instead, the borrower's thirty-year-old daughter held the debt. The daughter was simply
planning to drive her mother to the lender's office to finalize the deal. However, when she
arrived, the lender convinced her not only to cosign the debt, but also to include her outside
debts in the loan amount. Furthermore, the amount of the third-party debt added up to well over
$1000.
20. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111 (1938) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44, 45, 52-58 (2000)).
21. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957,965-67 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing
the legislative history of the FTC Act).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). This particular section of the United States Code is also
commonly referred to as Section 5(a) of the FTC Act. Am. Fin. Servs., 767 F.2d at 972. After
the amendment, the Supreme Court, in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972),
validated the ability of the Federal Trade Commission and other agencies to determine whether
or not a particular act was sufficiently unfair or deceptive to lead to a penalty.
23. The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated policy statements that attempt to
shed light on each term. In 1980, it released a policy statement that set out the factors for an
"unfair" practice. Policy Statement on Consumer Unfairness, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,203
(Dec. 17, 1980) [hereinafter 1980 Policy Statement]. In 1983, it released a policy statement
describing deceptive acts. Policy Statement on Deceptive Acts and Practices, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,205 (Oct. 14, 1983). In 1984, the agency officially adopted the unfairness policy
statement in the context of an agency decision. See In re Int'l Harvestor Co., 104 F.T.C. 949,
1060 (1984); see also Roger E. Schechter, The Unfairness of Click-On Software Licenses, 46
WAYNE L. REv. 1735, 1764-65 (2000).
24. For an extensive discussion of the history behind the FTC Act and the genesis and
evolution of the FTC's unfairness power, see Schechter, supra note 23, at 1759-66. See also
Ernest Gellhorn, TradingStamps, S & H, and the FTC's UnfairnessDoctrine, 1983 DUKE L.J.
903 (1983); David A. Rice, Consumer Unfairness at the FTC: Misadventures in Law and
Economics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1983).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(2), 57(a)-(e).
26. Id. §§ 45(a)(2), 57(g). There are several federal agencies that regulate banks in the
United States. The Federal Reserve regulates state-chartered banks that are members of the
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Despite this split in power, agencies and courts have not burdened lawyers with
incongruous definitions of unfairness. The entities each analyze unfairness under a
common approach; they rely on the framework established by the 1980 FTC Policy
Statement. 28 The consistency in the unfairness standard across agencies prevents undue
confusion.
Although the government agencies and courts use the same concepts to evaluate
unfairness, the enumerated standards do not provide clear-cut rules. Professor Calkins
succinctly explains this point:
The Supreme Court has not spoken. No new court of appeals has weighed in. No
opinion of the Commission addresses FTC Act Section 5(n). The Commission has
not based any new Trade Regulation Rule on the unfairness authority ....
In part due to the dearth of binding precedent, the law of FTC unfairness
remains indeterminate. . . . Observers recognized that the 1980 Unfairness
Statement, while a significant analytic contribution, failed to draw bright lines
delineating unfair practices .... 29
Despite its vagueness, the 1980 FrC Policy Statement still anchors any unfairness
analysis. The FTC issued its statement as a letter addressed to the Consumer
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology.30
After studying the FTC Act jurisprudence,
the FTC found that it was able to isolate the
31
factors used to determine unfairness.

Federal Reserve System. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") regulates
national banks. Finally, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") regulates insured
state banks that are not part of the Federal Reserve System. OCC, Public Information, at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/pubinf.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2004).
27. For a discussion concerning the interplay between the agencies and the courts, see
Stephen Calkins, FTC Unfairness:An Essay, 46 WAYNE L. REv. 1935, 1947-50 (2000).
28. See 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 23. All involved entities, including the
FDIC, OCC, FTC, and the Federal Reserve, have consistently used the same three-factor
definition for unfairness. See Guidance on Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 6 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 64-122 (Mar. 22, 2002) (using the three-factor test outlined by the
FTC's policy statement). The Federal Reserve Board has consistently cited the FTC's policy
statement on unfairness as authoritative. Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve, to Congressman John J. LaFalce, Ranking Member of the House Committee on
FinancialServices
(May
30,
2002),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/ oarddocs/press/bcreg/2002/20020530/attachment.pdf
(last
visited Jan. 14, 2005).
29. Calkins, supra note 27, at 1960-61 (internal footnotes omitted); see also
Schechter, supra note 23, at 1770-72 ("The concept of 'injury' in the law of unfairness is
surprisingly underdeveloped.").
30. See 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 20,907 ("Rather than merely
reciting the law, we have attempted to provide the Committee with a concrete indication of the
manner in which the Commission has enforced, and will continue to enforce, its unfairness
mandate.").
31. Id. at 20,908. The agency fit its important summary squarely within the
boundaries of prior Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S.
233, 249 (1972).
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The FTC's statement emphasized the role of consumer injury as the primary
indicator of an "unfair practice."3 2 Prior to the policy, consumer injury was one factor,
among others, in an unfairness analysis. 33 The FTC, however, recognized a shift in the
concept of unfairness, "Unjustified consumer injury is the primary focus of the FTC
Act ....

By itself it can be sufficient to warrant a finding of unfairness."

4

The

contemporary
unfairness jurisprudence focuses solely on a finding of consumer
3
injury.

This emphasis on consumer injury led to the development of the three-prong test for
unfairness that courts and agencies now uniformly employ. 36 In fact, Congress has
explicitly codified the three-prong standard into the FTC Act. 37 While neither the
Federal Reserve nor the FTC has promulgated regulations that explicitly define
specific mortgage lending practices as unfair, 38 39
the agencies apply the FTC Act's threeprong unfairness test in the home lending area.
B. Unsecured Credit Payoffs Satisfy the Three-Prong Test for FTC Act Unfairness
To constitute an unfair practice under the FTC Act, the consumer injury must satisfy
three requirements: "[The injury] must be substantial; it must not be outweighed by any
counterveiling benefits to consumers or competition that the practice produces; and'4it
must be an injury that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided. 0
The injury caused by unsecured credit payoffs sufficiently satisfies each prong of the
FTC test.

32. See 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 20,908-09.
33. Id. at 1 20,908. The three factors for unfairness were "(1) whether the practice
injures consumers; (2) whether it violates established public policy; (3) whether it is unethical or

unscrupulous." id. (internal footnotes omitted).
34. Id. The FTC also deemphasized the two other factors, basically leaving consumer
injury as the main ingredient for a finding of unfairness. See Calkins, supranote 27, at 1953-55.
35. See Schechter, supra note 23, at 1765 (discussing the primacy of "consumer
injury").
36. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1364-65 (11th Cir.
1988) (discussing in detail the three-prong status and the primacy of the "consumer injury"
factor).
37. Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, 108
Stat. 1691 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000)).
38. The agencies have promulgated rules governing credit practices in the non-real
estate context, See Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices (Regulation AA), 12 C.F.R. pt. 227
(2004) (governing credit practices in the banking industry); Credit Practices, 16 C.F.R. pt. 444
(2004) (governing credit practices in the remaining contexts). These regulations provide the
detail and clarity absent in the mortgage lending context. See Letter from Alan Greenspan to
John J. LaFalce, supra note 28, at 2-3 (discussing the Federal Reserve Board's decision not to
promulgate explicit regulations for unfairness in mortgage lending).
39. See, e.g., Supervisory Guidance on Predatory Lending Practices, 6 Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 64-125 (Feb. 21, 2003) (discussing the FTC Act's applicability to abusive
mortgage loans).
40. See 1980 Policy Statement, supranote 23, at 20,908; see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
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It is important to recognize at the outset, however, that this analysis will vary
somewhat from the FFC's standard case-by-case analysis. 4' Normally when the FTC
engages in the three-prong analysis, it evaluates a single fact pattern. While this caseby-case analysis is necessary to determine whether a particular entity should face a
sanction, the context of this Note requires an analysis independent from a specific
controversy. Rather than focusing on the actions of a particular corporation, it uses this
three-part test to demonstrate the unfair elements that inhere in unsecured credit
payoffs. The hypothetical situation outlined above is employed in order to avoid an
entirely abstract analysis.
1. The Practice Causes Substantial Consumer Injury
For a practice to be deemed unfair, it must cause consumers substantial injury.4 The
magnitude of the injury is measured from an objective standpoint and typically
involves a consumer's financial loss. 43 "In most cases a substantial injury involves
monetary harm, as when sellers coerce consumers into purchasing unwanted goods or
services ..."44 Simply put, "[t]o qualify as substantial,
an injury must be real, and it
'4
must be large compared to the offsetting benefits. 1
An early D.C. Circuit case, reviewing an FTC action, discussed various types of
injury that courts consider in the "substantial injury" inquiry. In American Financial
Services v. FTC,46 the agency challenged two of the defendant's credit practices as
unfair. First, the defendant required consumers to "give a non-possessory security
interest in their household goods and personal effects" in exchange for credit.47 This
practice, while providing limited economic security to the creditor, had devastating
economic and psychological effects on the debtor. 8 For instance, it allowed the
creditor to exploit the debtor's emotional connection to his goods and, consequently,
coerce the debtor into accepting the creditor's terms.49
Second, the defendant imposed wage assignments that allowed it to receive all or a
portion of the debtor's wages directly from his employer.5 0 These assignments occurred

41. See Schechter, supra note 23, at 1770 (discussing the general approach of the FTC
in evaluating unfairness in trade).
42. 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 20,908.
43. J. Howard Beales, I1,
FTC's Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and
Resurrection (unpublished manuscript), at www.ftc.govlspeechesfbeales/unfairO6O3.htm (last
visited Sept. 4, 2004). Beales is the director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the Federal
Trade Commission. Id. While his article does not officially state the positions of the FTC, it
provides a strong insight into the history and use of the test. I will utilize this work throughout
this Note.
44. 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 20,908.
45. Beales, supra note 43 (footnote omitted).
46. 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
47. Id. at 973.
48. Id. ("While the monetary gain realized bythe creditor upon seizure... is minimal
to nonexistent, the replacement cost to the consumer is substantial, not to mention the
sentimental value of the possessions and the psychological impact of the loss on the
consumer.").
49. Id. at 974.
50. Id.
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5
without a hearing; the debtor had no ability to present a defense. ' Aside from the
procedural unfairness to the debtor, wage assignments had devastating effects on the
debtor's economic situation. 2 The practice caused some debtors to lose their jobs."
Furthermore, the assignments usually occurred at a time of financial hardship and
"tend[ed] to cause further disruption of family finances54and.., even put at risk a wage
earner's ability to provide necessities for the family."
55
In another landmark case, Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, the substantial injury
56
Through its policy
practice.
flowed from the financial consequences of the challenged
more than
generated
Orkin
customers,
with
contracts
breaching
unilaterally
of
57
$7,000,000 in revenue from 200,000 breached contracts. The court found that this
58
high level of consumer loss compelled a finding of substantial injury.
A recent FTC enforcement action similarly focused on financial injuries. In that
case, the government required a major lending entity to return $40,000,000 to
consumers. 59 The FTC attorneys charged Fairbanks Capital Corporation, one of the
country's largest subprime lenders, "with engaging in a variety of unfair, deceptive,
6
and illegal practices in the servicing of subprime mortgage loans." The agency
61
closely scrutinized Fairbanks's protocol for charging service fees. The complaint
noted that:

Fairbanks profits from money it "advances" to the consumer to pay for items that
Fairbanks deems necessary to protect its rights in the property. These "corporate
advances" include fees for property inspections, demand letters, [and] broker's
the loan balance, and
price options .... These corporate advances are added to
62
Fairbanks profits from interest charged on the advances.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id. ("Employers are hostile to wage assignments due to added administrative
costs and burdens and the fear that the employee's job motivation and performance will suffer as
a result of the reduction of wages. Moreover, employers tend to view the consumer's failure to
repay the debt as a sign of irresponsibility.") (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 975.
55. 849 F.2d 1354 (llth Cir. 1988).
56. The FTC' s report stated that "[tihe harm resulting from Orkin' s conduct consists
of increased costs for services previously bargained for and includes the intangible loss of the
certainty of the fixed price term in the contract." Id. at 1364-65 (quoting In re Orkin
Exterminating Co., 108 F.T.C. 263, 362 (1986)); see also Schechter, supra note 23, at 1771.
57. Orkin, 849 F.2d at 1356, 65.
58. Id. at 1365.
59. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Fairbanks Capital Settles FTC and
HUD Charges (Nov. 12, 2003), at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/11/fairbanks.htm (last visited
Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter FTC, Fairbanks Capital Settles].
60. Id.
61. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief and Monetary
Civil Penalties, United States v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., No. 03-12219 (D. Mass. filed Nov. 12,
2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003111/0323014comp.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,2005) [hereinafter
Fairbanks,Complaint for Injunction].
62. Id. at 4.
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Furthermore, the agency discovered that the defendant charged late fees in an illegal
manner. 63 The FTC alleged that the defendant violated the unfairness provision in the
FTC Act by levying unwarranted servicing fees and illegal late fees. 64 The complaint
further alleged that Fairbanks caused financial harm to its mortgage consumers by
forcing them to purchase unnecessary insurance. "[D]efendants in numerous instances
have force placed casualty insurance on consumers' homes when such insurance was
already in place." 65 Not only was this "force placed" insurance unnecessary, but it was
in
also more expensive than insurance purchased by the consumer. 66
67 The court
Fairbanksfound a substantial harm and approved the consent order.
As in Fairbanksand Orkin, the substantial injury that flows from unsecured credit
payoffs is a financial one. The practice damages the borrower's finances in two ways.
First, the conversion of an unfinanced sum into a financed sum substantially increases
the borrower's formerly interest-free debt. Second, the conversion of unsecured debt
into secured debt heightens the risk in default.
Unsecured credit payoffs generally attach high interest rates to previously
unfinanced debts. 68 Like the fees that caused substantial injury in Fairbanks,these
debts "are added to the loan balance, and [the lender] profits from [the] interest
charged., 69 The lender extends the reach of the loan's high interest beyond the
mortgage amount and into the borrower's unrelated debts.
The Smith hypothetical will further illustrate the depth of the borrower's financial
loss. 70 Prior to the loan agreement, Ms. Smith held $1000 in various unsecured and
unfinanced debts. The lender forced Ms. Smith to pay off those debts and,
consequently, the additional $1000 was consolidated with her financed debt. Because
of this transaction, the original $1000 debt, when financed at thirteen percent annual
rate over thirty years, will transform into approximately $4000.71 The borrower, likely
unaware of the effects of the payoff, is forced to unduly pay for debts unrelated to the
mortgage. The lender, therefore, not only controls the cost of its mortgage service, it
in its complaint in
also controls the cost of the borrowers' other loans. The FTC,
72
Fairbanks,has recognized the unfairness of this manipulation.

63. Id. at 5-6.
64. FTC, Fairbanks Capital Settles, supra note 59.
65. Fairbanks,Complaint for Injunction, supra note 61, at 8.
66. Id. at 5.
67. FTC, Fairbanks Capital Settles, supra note 59.
68. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. Again, for those instances, like
credit card payoffs, in which the debt amount was already financed before the payoff, the
substantial injury flows from the transformation of unsecured debts into secured debts. See infra
notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
69. Fairbanks, Complaint for Injunction, supra note 61, at 4.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
71. At the above interest rate, Ms. Smith would have to pay $2990.42 in interest:
Amount Added to Principle
$1000 at 13% annual rate

Total Interest Cost
$2990.42

72. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.

Total Debt
$3990.42
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The unsecured credit payoffs further injure plaintiffs by securing formerly
unsecured debts. The injury involved in payoffs of unsecured yet financed debts (such
as credit cards) flows from this transformation. Commentators have noted that forcing
a person to refinance unsecured debt is unfair and predatory.73 In her analysis of
predatory lending, Odette Williamson notes that lenders who suggest consolidation "do
not mention that the higher debt74burden increases the risk of foreclosure and the longterm costs of debt repayment.
The transformation of the debts' secured status causes three distinct injuries. First,
as Williamson notes, 75 it increases the likelihood of the borrower losing her house
through foreclosure. When the borrower's unsecured, third-party debts are added to the
loan, the formerly unsecured sum becomes part of the secured mortgage debt. Before
the transaction, the borrower's third-party, unsecured debt was not tied to any
particular asset. 76 However, once the debt becomes secured, a relationship is formed
between the added debt and the collateral (namely, the borrower's home). 77 If the
borrower defaults on this formerly unsecured sum, as part of the mortgage debt, the
to her
creditor can reach the home. By increasing the amount of secured debt attached
78
home, the transformation "increases the [borrower's] risk of foreclosure."
Second, the transformation of the debts to secured status makes the debtor more
susceptible to collection on those debts than before the transformation. An unsecured
creditor has limited collection ability.79 "The unsecured creditor's path to payment is
narrow. Not only does the law provide procedures for the collection of unsecured
debts, it regulates or bars outright many alternatives." 80 On the other hand, the secured
creditor enjoys a more powerful position. The secured creditor does not have to hunt
for sufficient assets like an unsecured creditor; 8 rather, he can foreclose on the
collateral upon the borrower's default. 82 Given the inequality in collection power, the
borrower whose debts become secured loses a significant advantage that he had
previously held over the unsecured creditor. After the change in the debts' secured
status, he is much more susceptible to collection on those debts.
Third, the borrower loses the protection of state exemption statutes. State exemption
statutes classify some of a borrower's property as exempt from collection upon default
of an unsecured debt. 3 In other words, the statute sets aside some property as immune
from attachment. For example, suppose the three unsecured creditors from the

73. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 11.
74. Id. at 302.
75. Id.
76. LYNN M. LoPUcKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 13-15 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing the general nature of secured transactions).
77. Id. at 21.
78. Williamson, supra note 11, at 302.

79. RAYMONDT. NIMMER E" AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACrIONS: SECURED FINANCING
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 18 (2d ed. 1999) ("[The unsecured creditor's] ultimate success is
dicey at best.").

80. LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 76, at 4.
81. NIMMER ET AL., supra note 79, at 18 ("[Success] will depend on whether the
sheriff can locate sufficient nonexempt, unencumbered assets to satisfy your judgment.").
82. LoPUcKI & WARREN, supra note 76, at 29.
83. These exemption statutes exist in all fifty states. Id. at 15.
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hypothetical above attempt to collect from Ms. Smith before the mortgage agreement.
Suppose further that Ms. Smith lives in Indiana and that she holds only the following
assets: $3000 in personal goods and $4000 in home equity. Due to the Indiana
exemption statute,84 which protects up to $4000 in personal goods and up to $7500 in
home equity from unsecured creditors, the three creditors cannot collect any part of the
debt until Ms. Smith obtains some non-exempt assets. Once Ms. Smith's debts become
secured, she loses this protection.
The lender that mandates unsecured credit payoffs causes substantial injury to the
borrower by attaching significant interest to small, unfinanced loans and by increasing
the danger inherent in85those loans. This conclusion follows logically from the FTC's
Fairbankscomplaint.
2. The Benefits Do Not Outweigh the Substantial Injury
For a practice to classify as unfair under the FTC Act, the substantial injury must
outweigh any benefits to the consumer or to the competitive market.8 6 "The
Commission is aware of... tradeoffs and will not find that a practice unfairly injures
consumers unless it is injurious in its net effects." 87 The FTC primarily takes into
account the practice's economic 88effect; however, it can also consider non-economic
factors in its balancing equation.
As I have stated above, commentators have recognized the predatory nature of
89
unsecured credit payoffs. In line with this analysis, this Note contends that the
benefits of these payoffs do not outweigh the substantial injury that the practice causes.
Opponents may argue that the consumer receives a valuable consolidation service
for the additional interest he pays. It is true that the consumer might enjoy the
consolidated payments. Yet, one must view this potential benefit in the full context-it
was forced on the borrower by the lender. Therefore, the benefit from the consolidation
does not flow from an optional term selected by the borrower in negotiations; such spin
doctoring obscures the coercive nature of the practice. Moreover, the debt
consolidation is costly. The consumer receives the ease of consolidation only after
giving up unfinanced, unsecured debt. She does not receive the reduced interest rate
offered by many loan consolidation packages, which are advertised in the media.
Rather, the borrower pays a higher interest rate than before consolidation.

84. IND. CODE § 34-55-10-2 (2000).
85. FTC, Fairbanks Capital Settles, supra note 59.
86. 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 20,909; see also Beales, supra note 43
("[Tihe next step is to determine whether the harm is outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or competition.").
87. 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 20,909.
88. Id. The FTC policy statement on unfairness gives several examples of the noneconomic considerations used by the FTC: "[These other considerations] include not only the
costs to the parties directly before the agency, but also the burdens on society in general in the
form of increased paperwork, increased regulatory burdens on the flow of information, reduced
incentives to innovation and capital formation, and similar matters." Id. Clearly this list is not
exclusive.
89. See Williamson, supra note 11, at 302.
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One could also argue that unsecured credit payoffs benefit low-income borrowers in
the competitive market. The practice encourages more subprime lending by reducing
the risk the lenders face. 9° The payoffs reduce risk by relieving the borrower's outside
debt obligations. Once the payoffs free the borrower, he can focus on paying the
mortgage debt. Nevertheless, this practice does not reduce risk inherent in the
borrower's third-party debt. It is true that the payoffs will cause the borrower to focus
solely on the mortgage lender. The practice, however, does not alleviate the risk from
the paid-off debts because the borrower still has to pay the debt amount herself. The
mortgagee's payment did not relieve the mortgagor's outside obligations; the debt
simply changed hands.
An advocate for the lenders' position might also claim that the payoffs reduce risk
in the early, crucial stage of the mortgage period by increasing the likelihood that the
borrower will make the first payments. Lenders arguably bear the most risk during the
early stages of the mortgage agreement. 9 ' Therefore, they force the credit payoffs so
that the borrower has no encumbrances that may keep her from making the first
mortgage payments. While these payoffs do not relieve the borrower's debt burden, the
payoffs guarantee that money formerly earmarked for other creditors will be available
for use early in the mortgage term. This practice will increase the likelihood of early
payment and, therefore, significantly decrease the risk involved.92
In practice, however, these payoffs do not free up money already earmarked for
unsecured debts. The argument is premised on the assertion that the borrower's
obligation to the unsecured debt in the early stages may interfere with his mortgage
obligation. This premise is faulty for several reasons. First, due to the increased danger
inherent in secured transactions, the borrower already has an incentive to pay off
secured creditors before unsecured creditors, even without the credit payoffs.93 The
mortgage creditor can foreclose on his house; the unsecured creditor does not have
such compelling collateral.94 The unsecured creditor's comparative disadvantage in
debt collection gives the borrower a further reason to pay off his secured debts before
his unsecured debts. 95 He knows that the secured creditor can collect upon default.
Therefore, the forced payment of unsecured debt does not provide a significantly
higher likelihood of an early payment on secured debts.

90. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
91. As the borrower's equity in the security increases, the risk of default decreases.
Therefore, the risk of default is highest during the early stages of the mortgage loan. See ROBERT
SCHAFER & HELEN F. LADD, DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING 16 (1981) ("Default risk
... should decrease as the borrower's equity in the mortgaged property increases."). On the
other hand, the fact that borrowers pay mostly interest in the early stages may suggest that
borrowers account for the risk.
92. For instance, if the payoff amount is $1000 and the monthly mortgage payment is
$500, it can be argued that the payoff clears up the money for two mortgage payments.
93. See supra notes 73-83 and accompanying text.
94. LOPUCKI & WARREN, supra note 76, at 22 ("The recognition of enhanced
collection fights for secured creditors necessarily diminishes the effectiveness of the collection
rights of general unsecured creditors.").
95. Id. at 21-22.
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3. The Injury is Not Reasonably Avoidable
A practice is not unfair unless the consumer could not have reasonably avoided the
injury.96 The FTC generally assumes it should not act against the decisions of
consumers and that a competitive market will rid itself of most injurious practices. 97
"We anticipate that consumers will survey the available alternatives, choose those that
98
are most desirable, and avoid those that are inadequate or unsatisfactory." Practices
that reduce an individual's ability to choose alternatives and that withstand market
forces require intervention." Therefore, the FTC focuses on practices that prevent
consumers from freely exercising their decisionmaking power.1t ° For example, the
that] exercise an
FTC will aim at sellers that "engage in overt coercion... [or sellers
' 1
undue influence over highly susceptible classes of purchasers. o
In the subprime market, a consumer's poor credit history diminishes his mortgage
options.'1 2 Consequently, lenders employ rates, fees, and terms that consumers in the
standard credit market would not tolerate. 0 3 The benefits of many of these costly
subprime practices outweigh the injury to the consumer. Without them, the risk
inherent in the market would prevent anyone from providing credit services to
subprime borrowers. 14 Unsecured credit payoffs, however, do not provide lenders risk
protection that outweighs the injury to consumers.'0 5 Yet, despite the financial injury
flowing from forced payoffs, 1° 6 unsecured credit payoffs are still common in the
subprime market.'°7 Because borrowers stuck in subprime have limited options, lenders

96. 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 20,909; see also Beales, supra note 43
("[Tlhe concept of reasonable avoidance keeps the Commission from substituting its
paternalistic choices for those of informed customers.").
97. 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 20,909.
98. id.
99. Id.; see also Beales, supra note 43 ("If consumers could have made a different
choice, but did not, the Commission should respect that choice.").
100. 1980 Policy Statement, supranote 23, at 20,909; see also Beales, supra note 43
("The primary purpose of the Commission's modern unfairness authority continues to be to
protect consumer sovereignty by attacking practices that impede consumers' ability to make
informed decisions.").
101. 1980 Policy Statement, supra note 23, at 20,909.
102. Eggert, supra note 2, at 573-74.
103. PredatoryMortgage Lending: The Problem, Impact, and Responses: Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs, 107th Cong. 250-52 (2001)
(testimony of John A. Courson, President and CEO, Central Pacific Mortgage Co., on behalf of
the Mortgage Bankers Association).
104. Eggert, supra note 2, at 573-74 ("Lenders argue that they charge higher interest
rates and fees for subprime loans because of the increased risk characteristics of subprime
borrowers.").
105. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing of
benefits).
106. See supra notes 42-85 and accompanying text.
107. See RENUART & KEEST, supra note 10, at 89; see alsoWilliamson, supranote 11,
at 302. For an in-depth discussion of the persistence of predatory lending practices in the
marketplace (including unsecured credit payoffs), see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy,
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have no incentive to stop mandating unsecured credit payoffs. The market will not
eliminate unsecured credit payoffs by itself, and this practice cannot be reasonably
avoidable to consumers.
0°
In American FinancialServices Inc. v. FTC,' the D.C. Circuit Court forcefully
depicted the unavoidable nature of certain injurious credit practices in the high-risk,
subprime arena. The challenged consumer finance company required two harmful
contract terms of its prospective borrowers: wage assignments and a security interest in
household goods. 1°9 Recognizing the difficult position of people in the high-risk
lending market, the court found the practices reasonably unavoidable:
As noted, standard form contracts are presented on a take it or leave it basis. While
there are differences in the kinds of contracts offered by different creditors, certain
creditors, namely finance companies serving higher-risk borrowers, are most likely
to include HHG [household goods] security interests and wage assignments.
Furthermore while the incidence of use of these provisions may differ across
different regions of the country, contracts offered by creditors of a given class in
local areas are often substantially identical. Given the substantial similarity 1of
10
contracts, consumers have little ability or incentive to shop for a better contract.
Like the high-risk borrowers in American FinancialServices, the borrowers at issue
in this Note are forced to either take the contracts with the injurious provision or leave
them. Because of their subprime position, they "have little ability or incentive to shop
for a better contract.""' The practice is not reasonably avoidable to those subprime
borrowers.
Furthermore, the mandatory nature of unsecured credit payoffs illustrates the
similarities between them and the unfair, reasonably unavoidable practice in
12
Fairbanks.As with the unnecessary insurance required by the lender in Fairbanks,
these payoffs are not offered as an option for borrowers in exchange for higher rates.
The borrower's inability to meaningfully bargain amplifies his limited choices.
Because unsecured credit payoffs cause substantial injury that is neither reasonably
avoidable nor outweighed by counterveiling benefits, the practice is unfair under the
FTC Act.
C. Plaintiffs Suffering from the Unfairnessof Unsecured Credit Payoffs Do Not
Have an FTCAct Remedy
When an entity engages in an unfair commercial practice, the FTC Act empowers
the relevant government agency to rectify the situation. "The [Federal Trade]
Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or
corporations... from using unfair methods of competition ... and unfair or deceptive

A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of PredatoryLending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255,
1263-64, 1280-98 (2002).
108. 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
109. For a discussion of the injurious nature of these credit practices, see supra notes
46-54 and accompanying text.
110. Am. Fin. Servs., 767 F.2d at 977 (internal citations omitted).
111. Id.
112. Fairbanks,Complaint for Injunction, supra note 6t, at 4-5.
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,113

the procedures that the FTC
The statute further stipulates
acts or practices ....
114
should follow in pursuing a violation of the act.
While the FTC Act does not explicitly provide government agencies the sole ability
to bring an unfairness action, courts have almost unanimously held that the act does not
give an individual a private right of action. Prior to the 1938 amendment, which
sanctioned entities engaging in unfair trade practices, l5 the Supreme Court denied
private plaintiffs the right to bring an unfair competition action under the FTC Act in
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.1 6 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim,
stating that "[t]here is an attempt to allege unfair methods of competition, which may
be put aside at once, since relief in such cases under the7 Trade Commission Act must
be afforded in the first instance by the commission."1
Lower courts have extended this prohibition beyond the context of unfair
competition into the realm of unfair and deceptive practices. In Holloway v. BristolMeyers Corp., the D.C. Circuit held that "consumers and members of the public at
large" could not "bring... private action[s] to enforce §5 ... of the [FTC] Act...
which prohibit[s] unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."" 9 With the
court, 20 the federal courts have consistently
exception of a single federal district
2
1
lead.'
Circuit's
followed the D.C.
The FTC has not considered the fairness of unsecured credit payoffs, and
consequently those injured by the practice have received no remedy. Moreover, the
absence of a private right of action leaves a borrower whose lender forced such a credit
payoff in an unfair lending situation with no clear remedial path. While the consumer
should inform the FTC of the unfair credit practice, it is also in her best interest to
inquire into alternative remedies. She should start by examining state unfairness acts or
"Little FTC" acts.122 These statutes typically include a private right of action 2 3 and are

113. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000). Congress also provided a similar power to the
Federal Reserve Board and other agencies to curb unfair practices in the banking context. 15
U.S.C. § 57(a).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(m).
115. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
116. 270 U.S. 593 (1926); see Allan B. Currie, A Private Right of Action Under
Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 1268, 1269 (1971)
(discussing the origins of the rule against a private right of action under the FTC Act). Currie
claims that, at the time of Moore, the ruling was not as devastating to private actors because the
old federal common law provided a cause of action. Id. However, when the federal common law
was abolished by ErieR.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the full force of this decision was
felt. Currie, supra at 1269-70.
117. Moore, 270 U.S. at 603.
118. 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
119. Id. at 988 (internal footnotes and quotations omitted).
120. See Guernsey v. Rich Plan of Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976)
(recognizing a private right of action under the FTC Act).
121. See, e.g., Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720(9th Cir. 1981); Naylor v. Case &
McGrath, Inc., 585 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1978); Freedman v. Meldy's, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 658,65960 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (discussing in detail the case law against a private right of action).
122. See generallyDonald M. Zupanec, Annotation, PracticesForbiddenby State
Deceptive Trade Practiceand Consumer ProtectionActs, 89 A.L.R.3d 449 (1979) (discussing
in depth the state statutes designed to curb unfair and deceptive acts).
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often similar to the FTC Act.' 24 However, the borrower should not limit herself to a
state cause of action that may not exist in a particular jurisdiction and that may be
construed narrowly.
The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA") provides a potential
avenue for subprime borrowers looking to remedy the FTC Act as it defined
unfairness.125 HOEPA and the FTC Act have a close logical connection as both statutes
target a similar problem-predatory lending. 26 According to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), "[p]redatory lending practices [which may be
violate other laws, such as HOEPA, which covers
unfair under the FTC Act] also may127
certain high-cost mortgage loans."'
HOEPA provides an avenue to remedy the unfairness in unsecured credit payoffs
that the FTC Act does not. However, the finding of unfairness under the FTC Act is not
irrelevant. Rather, the unremedied unfairness provides judges a policy incentive to fit
the practice into the HOEPA remedial framework. As explained further below, this
strategy of employing a statutory violation to fit a practice into another statute is
as the FTC itself used it in a case that involved both HOEPA and the FTC
legitimate
28
Act.
III. UNSECURED CREDIT PAYOFFS AS A HOEPA FINANCE CHARGE: PROVIDING A
REMEDIAL COURSE FOR THE FTC ACT-DEFINED UNFAIRNESS

A. The HOEPA Amendment to the Truth in Lending Act
In 1968, Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). 12 9 The original
TILA, which applies to almost every consumer credit transaction, requires the lender to
follow a uniform disclosure framework in which the borrower can see the cost of the
transaction before deciding to enter into an agreement. 130 Congress passed the law in

123. Debra A. Burke, Cruise Lines and Consumers: Troubled Waters, 37 AM. Bus.
L.T 689, 710-11 (2000) ("Although many of the state acts mimic the Federal Trade Commission
Act ... unlike the federal legislation, nearly all state acts create a private cause of action for
aggrieved consumers.") (internal citations omitted).
124. See Zupanec, supranote 122, § 2[b], at 462 ("[C]ounsel seeking guidance [with
the state acts] ... are advised to refer to the large number of federal judicial and administrative
decisions which consider the question of the lawfulness of particular acts or practices under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, inasmuch as the language utilized in many state deceptive trade
practice and consumer protection statutes is similar to the language of the federal act.").
125. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108
Stat. 2190 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2004)).
126. See, e.g., Letter from Alan Greenspan to John J. LaFalce, supra note 28; Press
Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Testifies on Enforcement, Consumer Education
Initiatives to Combat Predatory Lending Practices (Feb. 26, 2001), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/200l/02/predlending.htm.
127. Supervisory Guidance on Predatory Lending Practices, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 64-125, at 73,849-12 (Feb. 21, 2003) (discussing the HOEPA framework as an
alternative means of curbing unfair and predatory lending practices).
128. See infra notes 192-213 and accompanying text.
129. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
1601 (2000)).
130. RALPH J. ROHNER & FRED H. MILLER, TRuTH INLENDING 3 (2000).
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order to "promote the informed use of consumer credit. ' 3 1 In its findings, it
determined that "economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition
of
among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the3 extension
2
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit.'
In 1994, Congress passed HOEPA as an amendment to the TILA in order to address
specifically the predatory aspects of subprime mortgage loans.' 33 Not all mortgage
transactions, however, fit within the scope of HOEPA.1 34 If the loan qualifies, HOEPA
TILA required, 35 and it
requires lenders to disclose more information than the initial
36
loan.'
the
of
terms
the
on
limitations
substantive
places
The loan must satisfy two basic requirements to gamer HOEPA coverage. First, the
statute only covers "consumer credit transaction[s] that [are] secured by the consumer's
principal dwelling."' 37 Moreover, it exempts mortgages that finance the acquisition or
initial construction of a dwelling, 138 reverse mortgage transactions, and open-ended
credit plans. "Thus, most covered transactions will be refinancing loans or home
improvement loans and credit sales., 139 HOEPA does cover both first 4and subordinate
lien loans, as long as the loan is secured by the creditor's residence. 0
Second, a loan must satisfy one of the two statistical tests before the borrower can
enjoy HOEPA protection. A loan will satisfy the second element of HOEPA coverage
if "[t]he annual percentage rate at consummation will exceed by more than 8
percentage points for first-lien loans, or by more than 10 percentage points for
subordinate-lien loans, the yield on Treasury securities having comparable periods of
4
The loan may also fulfill the second element if the
maturity to the loan maturity.""1

131.
132.
133.
(D.D.C. 2002)

Id. at 4 (citing Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (2003)).
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).
See Cooper v. First Gov't Mortgage & Investors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d 50, 54
(discussing the statutory history of HOEPA and TILA); see generally Margot

Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate Remedial Actions, 6 N.C.
BANKING INST. 111 (2002). For a discussion of the predatory aspects of subprime mortgage

loans see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
134. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32 (2003) (outlining the elements of a HOEPA loan).
135. See Cooper, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa); see Cooper, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 54 ("Congress intended
HOEPA to result in greater disclosure to borrowers involved in high cost loans and to stop
certain loan terms and practices."); see also ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 130, at 452-57.
Furthermore, lawyers may use a loan's HOEPA status as a bargaining chip in settlement talks
because qualification imprints the lender with the stigma of predatory lending.
137. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1); ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 130, at 453. Some
courts break this first requirement into four subparts. "More specifically, a high cost or HOEPA
loan is: 1) a consumer credit transaction 2) with a creditor 3) that is secured by the consumer's
principal dwelling 4) and is a second or subordinate residential mortgage ..."Cooper,238 F.
Supp. 2d at 53 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Lopez v. Delta Funding Corp., No. CV 98-7204, 1998
WL 1537755, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1998).
138. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(24) (defining "residential mortgage transaction"); id. at §
226.32(a)(2)(i) (exempting "residential mortgage transactions").
139. ROHNER & MILLER,supra note 130, at 453. As Williamson states, "[riefinancing

and home equity loans are covered." Williamson, supra note 11, at 304.
140. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a).
141. Id. § 226.32(a)(1)(i).
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total "points and fees"'' 42 payable by the consumer at or before closing will exceed 8%
of the total loan amount. 143 The amount an unsecured credit payoff should help satisfy
this "points and fees" test. 44
If a loan satisfies both elements of the HOEPA statutory framework, it is then
subject to restrictive rules for credit disclosure and to substantive limitations in the
46
terms of the loan.' 45 Along with the standard disclosure required by TILA,1 HOEPA
percentage
annual
lenders must provide a warning notice about the transaction, the
rate, the amount of a regular monthly payment and the amount of a balloon payment, a
statement that the interest rate and monthly rate might vary (in a variable-rate
mortgage), and the amount borrowed. 14' The terms of a HOEPA-qualifying loan cannot
include balloon payments,

1 48

negative amortization,

149

advance payments,

150

an

15

increased interest rate after default, ' a refund calculated by the statutory actuarial
154
15 3
or any other unfair or
a due-on-demand clause,
penalties,
prepayment
method,
55
practices.'
deceptive
If a lender violates either the disclosure requirements or the substantive term
limitations of HOEPA, the borrower can take advantage of "powerful" private
remedies.1 6 "HOEPA explicitly provided that violations of its special protection

142. For the description of which amounts qualify as a point or fee, see infra notes
160-73 and accompanying text. As defined by HUD, a point is "normally paid at closing and
[is] generally calculated to be equivalent to 1%of the total loan amount .... [Points] are paid to
Glossary, at
Housing
HUD
a loan."
rate on
interest
the
reduce
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfhi/buying/glossary.cfm (last updated June 14, 2002) (last
visited Jan. 15, 2005).
143. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(ii). According to the statute, this "points and fees"
amount must exceed at least $400. Id. This $400 minimum actually is "adjusted annually on
January 1 by the annual percentage change in the Consumer Price Index that was reported on the
preceding June 1." Id.; see also Williamson, supra note 11, at 303-04.
144. For a very thorough demonstration of the "points and fees" calculation, see
Cooper v. First Gov't Mortgage & Investors Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d 50, 58-61 (D.D.C. 2002).
145. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)-(d); see also Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending
Practices in Brokered and Purchased Loans, 6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 64-126, at
73,849-16 (Aug. 15, 2003) (discussing HOEPA along with other consumer protection statutes)
[hereinafter Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending].
146. See ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 130, at 457 (describing the disclosures
required for HOEPA loans as "special").
147. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(l)-(5).
148. id. § 226.32(d)(1)(i). There is a narrow exception to the ban on balloon
payments. See id. § 226.32(d)(1)(ii).
149. Id. § 226.32(d)(2).
150. Id. § 226.32(d)(3).
151. Id. § 226.32(d)(4).

152. Id. § 226.32(d)(5) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1615(d) (2000)).
153. Id. § 226.32(d)(6). The statute lists exceptions to the ban on prepayment
penalties. Id. § 226.32(d)(7).

154. Id. § 226.32(d)(8),
155. ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 130, at 466 ("The Board is authorized by HOEPA
to prohibit other acts or practices in connection with covered loans that it finds to be unfair,
deceptive, or designed to evade the special rules.") (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1639(l)(2)(A) (2000)).
156. Williamson, supra note 11, at 303-05.
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provisions would entitle consumers to rescind mortgage loans and to recover the TILA
statutory penalties., 57 The borrower's power of rescission lasts either for three years
after the agreement or until she sells the property. 158 In addition, the borrower may
and fees connected to the extension of a loan that includes
recover the finance charges
59
the improper terms. 1
Because of the remedies available under HOEPA, a borrower has a strong reason to
fit his loan into the statutory framework. Thus, HOEPA can provide a remedial course
currently lacking under the FTC Act. This Note argues that the amount of an unsecured
credit payoff should count toward the satisfaction of the "points and fees" trigger test.
B. The Finance Charge as a Component in the HOEPA Pointsand Fees Test
As stated above, the second element for HOEPA coverage is satisfied if the "points
and fees" payable by the borrower exceed 8% of the loan amount.'6 This requires a
person to calculate two figures. He must first compute the threshold that satisfies the
test (the 8% of the loan amount). He must then compare this figure to the points and
fees he has. been charged. In order to determine these points and fees, he must include
the following four components:
i) all items required to be disclosed under § 226.4(a) and § 226.4(b) [which
includes finance charges], except interest or time-price differential; ii) all
compensation paid to mortgage brokers; iii) all items listed in § 227.4(c)(7)...
161
unless charge is reasonable ...; iv) premiums or other charges ....

reach the threshold, then the
If the points and fees, including finance charges,
62
borrower's loan satisfies the second element.1
The finance charges of a loan comprise a major component of the points and fees
amount.163 The total finance charge of a loan, simply put, "is the consumer's cost of

157. Newton v. United Cos. Fin. Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 444, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1998)

(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1639(j) (2000)).
158. 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)(3); see also ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 130, at 467
(discussing the remedies available under HOEPA).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(4) (2000); see also Newton, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 451;
Avoiding Predatory and Abusive Lending, supra note 145, at 73,849-16; Williamson, supra
note 11, at 304.
160. As I noted above, the total points and fees amount still must be over the
minimum threshold that is adjusted each year ($400 at the time HOEPA was passed). See supra
note 143. For a clear description of finance charges in the TILA/HOEPA framework, see DEE
PRIDGEN, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE LAW § 6:2 (2003 ed.).
161. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(1); see also Johnson v. The Know Fin. Group, No.
CIV.A.03-378, 2004 WL 1179335, at *5-7 (E.D. Pa. May 20,2004) (calculating points and fees
amount).
162. This description gives the gist of the HOEPA analysis. However, the actual

calculation can be a bitmore difficult. See ELIZABETH RENUART, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW
CENTER,STOP PREDATORY LENDING: A GUIDE FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES § 7.4.6, at 144-46 (2002)
(discussing in great detail the steps needed to calculate the point and fees amount).
163. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4 (describing which charges and fees in connection with a
credit transaction are considered finance charges).
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credit."' 64 The federal regulation interpreting TILA/HOEPA, Regulation Z, specifies
which charges qualify as finance charges.1 65 If an amount is considered a finance
charge under the regulatory definition, the borrower nears the qualification threshold
for HOEPA. 166 Because lenders often try to levy finance charges that near, but do not
mark, 67 a small additional amount can lead to HOEPA
exceed, the 8%
68
classification. 1

As a practical matter, the regulation provides two avenues for a borrower to classify
an amount as a finance charge. First, the amount may satisfy the four-part definition of
a finance charge.' 69 "The finance charge.., includes any charge payable directly or
indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor as an
incident to or condition of the extension of credit."'170 Second, the federal regulations
17 1
may explicitly grant a particular type of charge finance charge status. Courts are
more willing to consider an amount as a finance charge when it is listed in the
regulation than when they have to apply the four-part definition. 172 Still, courts have
been willing to look outside the explicit examples. 73
C. Unsecured Credit Payoffs Fit the Regulatory Definition of a Finance Charge
Because the HOEPA regulations do not list unsecured credit payoffs as finance
a finance
charges, 174 a borrower must instead satisfy the following four-part test:

164. RORNER & MILLER, supra note 130, at 107.
165. 12 C.F.R. § 226; see also Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 124 S. Ct.
1741 (2004) (upholding Regulation Z as a valid interpretive rule).
166. RENUART, supra note 162, at 145.
167. For instance, in Johnson v. Banc One Acceptance Corp., 278 F. Supp. 2d 450,
459 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2003), the lender argued that the "points and fees" amount totaled 7.9995% of
the loan amount while the borrower argued that the amount totaled 8.0011%.
168. Judge Posner, in Cowen v. Bank United of Texas, FSB, 70 F.3d 937 (7th Cir.
1995), articulated the importance of finance charge arguments. "[A] suit for $14 ... may seem a
quixotic project. Not so.... [T]he plaintiffs, if they win, would be entitled to statutory damages
of $1000 without any proof of injury, because [TILA] allows the recovery of twice the finance
charge up to $1000, and the finance charge here exceeded $500." Id. at 941.
169. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a).
170. Id.
171. Id. § 226.4(b). Moreover, certain charges are explicitly excluded from finance
charge status. Id. § 226.4(c).
172. Cf. JAMEs H. PANNABECKER, I TRUTH-IN-LENDING MANUAL$ 2.01-.02 (rev. ed.
2003) (listing the outcomes of several cases decided both using the four-part test and using the
explicit examples of a TILA finance charge).
173. See, e.g., First Acadiana Bank v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 833 F.2d 548, 549-50
(5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the attorneys' fees charged were finance charges under Regulation
Z's standard definition); Bumpus v. Vandeford, No. 1:99CV070-SAA, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20062, at *14-15 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 27, 2002) (finding that "weekly extension fees" satisfy the
four-part test for finance charges); see also ROHNER & MILLER, supra note 130, at 114
("Regulation Z lists a number of types of charges that are included, but makes clear that these
are only examples and not an exhaustive list.") (internal citation omitted).
174. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b).
175. See supra notes 160-72 and accompanying text.
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charge is (i) any charge; (ii) payable directly or indirectly by the consumer; (iii)
imposed directly or indirectly by the creditor; (iv) as an incident to or a condition of
' All mandatory third-party credit payoffs, including unsecured
the extension of credit. 76
credit payoffs, meet this four-part definition of a finance charge. 177 The first element
requires analysis while the three other elements are satisfied by the definition of a
forced credit payoff.
First, an unsecured credit payoff is a charge. While the federal regulations do not
define the term,178 a "charge" is an expense faced by the borrower according to Black's
Law Dictionary.' 79 The National Consumer Law Center's Truth in Lending Manual
states that "[ulsually, a charge will be in the form of a cost added on to the borrower's
obligation."' 180 An unsecured credit payoff meets these definitions, as it is an expense
faced by the borrower in the credit transaction. The lender mandates the addition of the
payoffs to the borrower's obligation.
The District of Nebraska's finding in Campbell v. Liberty FinancialPlanning'81
supports the position that credit payoffs are "charges." According to the court, when a
lender requires a borrower to pay off debts owed to the lender, the amount of the
payoff is a finance charge.' 8 2 While Campbell does not address third-party credit
payoffs in the context of the "charge" analysis, the practice in Campbell is
indistinguishable from third-party credit payoffs. Both unsecured credit payoffs and the
practice in Campbell are credit payoffs; the fact that the money may go to an outside
party does not make its status as a "charge" different from the practice in Campbell.
Each results in an additional expense for the borrower.
The other three elements are easily satisfied.183 The borrower pays the amount,
satisfying the second element. Although the lender provides capital to the borrower, the
borrower is still responsible for paying off the outside debt. The third requirement is
fulfilled, as the creditor imposes the charge directly on the borrower. Finally, because
the payoff is a condition of the extension of credit, the fourth requirement is satisfied.
The borrower must agree to pay the amount before the lender will extend the credit.
While unsecured credit payoffs fit nicely into the four-part definition of a finance
charge, no precedent exists to support or refute their inclusion in the definition-judges

176. This four-part formulation comes from the National Consumer Law Center.
KEEST, supra note 10, § 3.5, at 87. This formulation is useful in its simplicity and
does not remove any important elements from the federal regulation. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a).
177. The National Consumer Law Center's Truth in Lending supports this
conclusion. "[Riequired pay-offs literally meet all the definitional elements of the
finance charge: they are a cost/charge, payable by the consumer, imposed by the
creditor as a condition of the extension of credit." RENUART & KEEST, supra note
10, § 3.6.1.1, at 88-89.
178. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a); RENUART & KEEST, supra note 10, § 3.6.1.1, at 88.
179. BLACK'S LAw DIcIONARY 227 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "charge" as a "[p]rice,
cost, or expense").
180. RENUART KEEST, supra note 10, § 3.6.1.1, at 88.
181. 422 F. Supp. 1386 (D. Neb. 1976).
182. Id. at 1389.
183. See RENuART & KEEST, supra note 10, § 3.6.1.2, at 88.
RENUART &
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have not analyzed this precise issue. 84 Furthermore, courts have split in their
evaluations of practices similar to unsecured credit payoffs.185 In a case in which a
creditor forced a borrower to pay off loans owed to the creditor, a federal judge held a
payoff amount to be a finance charge. 1 6 Importantly, this case provides an example of
a court willing to classify as a finance charge an amount that is not listed in the federal
regulation.18 7 The court in Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 8 however,
determined that if a creditor forces a borrower to pay off a third-party lien on the
collateral, the payoff amount does not count as a finance charge.
The practice in Smith can clearly be distinguished from unsecured credit payoffs.
The creditor in Smith had an extremely high interest in guaranteeing that the collateral
was free from outside liens before he entered into the credit contract.18 9 Such a lien
directly threatened the creditor's ability to recover upon default. The lender forcing
unsecured credit payoffs, however, does not have a similar motivation when the thirdparty debts do not involve the collateral. If the borrower defaulted on the refinancing
loan without paying off his unsecured outside debts, those outside unsecured creditors
do not threaten the mortgage lender's claim on the collateral.' 9°
Because precedent does not provide courts considering whether to classify
unsecured credit payoffs as finance charges with a clear approach (even though the
practice satisfies the regulatory definition), policy arguments should influence the
courts. The unremedied FTC Act-defined unfairness of unsecured credit payoffs should
give courts a sufficiently strong policy incentive to classify the payoff as a HOEPA
"finance charge," and thus provide an avenue to remedy the unfairness. Why should
this unfairness provide an incentive to remedy the practice using HOEPA rather than a

184. In fact, very few courts have analyzed any type of credit payoff under

TILA/HOEPA. See James D. Lockhart, Annotation, What Constitutes "FinanceCharge"Under
§ 106(a) of the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)) or Applicable Regulations, 154
A.L.R. FED. 431 (1999). Moreover, the Federal Reserve's Official Staff Commentary
interpreting Regulation Z does not address whether unsecured credit payoffs count as a finance
charge. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (2004). Finally, the newest Supreme Court case addressing
finance charges, Household CreditServs., Inc. v. Pfennig, 124 S. Ct. 1741 (2004), provides no
guidance. In Pfennig, a consumer argued that Regulation Z wrongfully excluded "over-limit
fees" from finance charge classification. Hence, the plaintiff mounted a challenge against the
text of the Regulation. Id. at 1744. Credit payoffs, on the other hand, are not explicitly listed in
Regulation Z and are instead evaluated using the four-part test. See supra notes 174-77 and
accompanying text. Thus, unlike Pfennig, this Note assumes that Regulation Z is a perfectly
valid exercise in rule-making.
185. See generally RENUART & KEEST, supra note 10, § 3.6.1.2, at 89 (describing the
different decisions involving credit payoffs); Lockhart, supra note 184, §§ 24-25 (same).
186. Campbell, 422 F. Supp. at 1389.
187. The court, finding the payoff amount to constitute a finance charge, stated: "The
lack of clear precedent in this area notwithstanding, the Court is required by all of the above
[statutory language] to find that the $100 payment by plaintiff on his mother's account was an
'incident to the extension of credit' [and, therefore, a finance charge]." Id.
188. 898 F.2d 896, 906-07 (3d Cir. 1990).
189. After examining the federal regulations and the four-pan test, the court stated:
"Examining this list, we are left with the firm impression that prior liens are not within the
definition of finance charge as that phrase was used by Congress." Id. at 906.
190. See LoPucKI & WARREN, supra note 76, at 22.
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different statutory framework? First, as demonstrated above, HOEPA can logically
remedy the unfairness because HOEPA's definition of a finance charge encompasses
unsecured credit payoffs. Second, two specific links between the statutes make
HOEPA a suitable remedial choice. The FTC Act and HOEPA share public policy
goals. Also, regulatory agencies have explicitly tied HOEPA and the FTC Act together
in recent cases. In fact, the FTC has used a HOEPA violation as an incentive to find
FTC Act unfairness.' 9' In light of this precedent, the use of FTC Act unfairness in the
HOEPA scheme becomes a realistic strategy.
D. Justifying the Use of Incentives: The Theoretical Connection and Connection in
Precedent Between HOEPA and the FTCAct
1. Policy Connection Between HOEPA and the FTC Act
Congress passed the FTC Act and HOEPA as two means of providing recourse to
92
While the FTC Act
consumers facing the harsh world of unfettered markets.
193
HOEPA provides
action,
generally aims at large-scale problems through agency
94
share a common
however,
two
statutes,
The
recover.
to
ability
the
actors
private
95
goal-to curb abuses in subprime mortgage lending.'
Several federal agencies demonstrate this common policy thread by using both laws
as weapons against predatory lending techniques. The FTC testified to Congress about
96
the usefulness of the two statutes in reducing abusive lending.' In an advisory letter,
lending, but that
predatory
the OCC noted that HOEPA is not the only tool to fight
"certain abusive lending can [also] involve unfair or deceptive practices and thus
97
violate.., the Federal Trade Commission Act."' The OCC advises banks to comply

191. See infra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
192. For the discussion of the increasing rate of foreclosures, especially in the
subprime market, see supra note 2.
193. For instance, in Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir.
1988), the FTC acted in response to the unfair treatment of around 200,000 customers. In
Fairbanks,the FTC brought an "unfairness" action against one of the nation's largest subprime
lenders to curb persistent predatory lending. FTC, Fairbanks Capital Settles, supra note 59.
194. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
195. Clearly, the FTC Act has other goals besides curbing predatory lending.
Reducing abuses in mortgage lending is one piece of the multi-prong act.
196. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Testifies on Enforcement and
Education Initiatives to Combat Predatory Lending Practices; Asks Congress to Consider
Legislative Expansions to Enhance Consumer Protection (May 24, 2000), at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/subprime2.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
197. Advisory Letter from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to Chief
Executive Officers of All National Banks and National Bank Operating Subsidiaries,
Department and Division Heads, and All Examining Personnel (Feb. 21, 2003), at
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2003-2.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005); see also
Supervisory Guidance on Predatory Lending Practices Through Brokers or Other Intermediaries,
6 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 64-126, at 73,849-16 (Aug. 15, 2003) ("High cost mortgage
loans.., must comply with the substantive protections and disclosure requirements set forth in
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ....Predatory loans may [also] involve
violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act....").
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98
with both HOEPA and the FTC act in order to avoid predatory lending penalties. 1
Furthermore, Alan Greenspan, in a letter to Congress, explained the Federal Reserve's
position that both statutes limit abuses in mortgage lending.199 The two statutes clearly
aim to alleviate the same problem.
The shared policy goals of the two statutes demonstrate a close connection that
justifies the statutory crossover that this Note suggests. Because the two statutes share
a common aim, a judge will not overstep the policy boundaries of HOEPA when she
uses it to remedy unfairness by classifying unsecured credit payoffs as finance
2
charges. 00

2. Connection in Precedent Between HOEPA and FTC Act
Recent FTC enforcement actions illustrate a connection in precedent between the
two statutes sufficient to justify the use of FTC Act unfairness as an incentive to
employ HOEPA. An FTC action against Barry Cooper Properties, a subprime
mortgage lender, displays the clearest example of this link.20 ' In Barry Cooper, the
lender allegedly included a prepayment penalty prohibited by HOEPA. 2°2 The FTC,
recognizing in its complaint the connection between HOEPA and the FTC Act, stated
that the HOEPA violation contributed to the unfairness of the alleged prepayment
penalties. "By engaging in a pattern or practice of making HOEPA mortgage loans
without regard to the payment ability of the consumers... the defendant has engaged,
and continues to engage, in unfair acts or practices in violation of Section 5 (a) of the
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)., 20 3 In its final order, the agency found that this HOEPA

198. The OCC also discussed the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA")
and Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") as other statutes that attempt to curb predatory
lending practices. The agency suggests that banks and other lending agencies need to consider
each of these statutes when attempting to avoid predatory lending practices. Supervisory
Guidance on Predatory Lending Practices Through Brokers or Other Intermediaries, 6 Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 64-126, at 73,849-16, 17 (Aug. 15, 2003); see also Press Release,
OCC, OCC Chief Counsel Julie L. Williams Urges Banks to be Vigilant in Avoiding Unfair and
Deceptive Marketing Practices (Mar. 22, 2002), at www.occ.treas.gov/2002/march.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2005).
199. Letter from Alan Greenspan to John J.LaFalce, supra note 28 (discussing the
Federal Reserve's role in limiting predatory lending).
200. It is important to reiterate that this Note does not suggest that all "unfair"
practices should qualify as finance charges.
201. See generally Consent Judgment and Order for Permanent Injunction, FTC v.
Barry
Cooper,
FTC
No.
982-3200
(C.D.
Cal.
1999),
http:f/www.ftc.govlos/1999/07fbccondec.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
202. Id. at 3; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Home Equity Lenders Settle
Charges that They Engaged in Abusive Lending Practices; Over Half Million Dollars To Be
Returned to Consumers (July 29, 1999), at http://www.ftc.gov/opal1999/07/hoepa.htm (last
visited Jan. 15, 2005).[hereinafter FTC, Home Equity Lenders].
203. Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, FTC v. Barry
Cooper,
FTC
No.
982-3200
(C.D.
Cal.
1999),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/hoepabarrycoopercmp.htm.
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2°4
violation provided the FTC with an incentive to find an "unfair" trade practice. Only
2 °5
one of the five commissioners disagreed with this approach.
The FTC has not limited this argumentative technique to Barry Cooper. In fact, it
has used a HOEPA violation as an incentive to find FTC unfairness in four other
enforcement actions.206 As Commissioner Orson Swindle noted in his dissent, "[t]hese
unfairness allegations are based on the theory that although these actions, standing
alone without HOEPA, do not meet the test for unfairness, factoring in HOEPA as
evidence of 'established public polic[y]' tips the balance toward establishing
20 7
These cases illustrate the strong bond in precedent between the two
unfairness.
20 8
statutes.
Not only do these cases amplify the public policy connection between HOEPA and
the FTC Act, illustrated above, 209 but they also demonstrate a practical connection that
the regulatory bodies use frequently. Moreover, the cases legitimate the argument that
this Note employs to classify payoffs as finance charges. The agency actions have
validated the use of a statutory violation as an incentive to employ a second, closelyrelated statute. The FTC, in fact, uses the same two statutes that this Note uses. Barry
Cooper provides clear support for the argument presented.
Moreover, the FTC's HOEPA-FTC Act argument in Barry Cooper provides vital
precedent to a court considering whether to classify unsecured credit payoffs under
HOEPA. As stated above, unsecured credit payoffs fit into the statutory definition of210a
HOEPA finance charge, yet no precedent existed to support such a classification.
After Barry Cooper,courts can rely on established case law to classify the payoffs as
finance charges. The FTC in Barry Cooper demonstrated that it is justifiable to use a
statutory violation as an incentive to employ a connected statute. A judge who employs
HOEPA after considering the FTC Act will not act in an unprecedented way.
One may argue Barry Cooper does not apply to my HOEPA-FTC Act argument
because the case only discusses the use of a HOEPA violation as an incentive to find
FTC Act unfairness. Barry Cooper does not suggest that a court can use unfairness to

204. See FTC, Home Equity Lenders, supranote 202. Commissioner Orson Swindle
explicitly stated, in dissent, that the FTC was using the HOEPA violation as an incentive.
205. As stated above, Commissioner Orson Swindle did not agree that HOEPA
violations should be used as an incentive to find FTC unfairness. ld.
206. FTC v. Granite Mortgage, LLC, FTC No. 982-3167 (E.D. Ky. 1999); FTC v.
LAP Fin. Servs., Inc., FTC No. 982-3169 (W.D. Ky. 1999); CLS Fin. Servs., FTC 982-3171
(W.D. Wash. 1999); FTC v.Wasatch Credit Corp., FTC No. 982-3191 (D. Utah 1991).
207. Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle Concurring in Part and Dissenting in
Part to Inre Granite Mortgage, LLC, File No. 982-3167; LAP Financial Servs., Inc, File No.
982-3169; CLS Mortgage Inc., File No. 982-3171; Wasatch Credit Corp., File No. 982-3191,
all available at http://www.fte.gov/osI1999/07/swindlestategranite.htm (July 1999) (second
alteration in original) (citation omitted) (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
208. Several additional agency enforcement actions further illustrate this doctrinal
connection between the two statutes. Recently, the OCC determined that Clear Lake National
Bank charged fees in the mortgage lending context that violated both HOEPA and the FTC Act.
In re Clear Lake National Bank, #AA-EC-03-25 (U.S. Dept. of Treasury, OCC 2003), available
at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/eas/ea2003-135.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005).
209. See supra notes 192-200.
210. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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employ HOEPA;
nothing in the case supports linking the statutes in the other
21
direction. 1
Three arguments counter this suggestion. First, the shared policy goals of the two
statutes facilitate the use of incentives in both directions. Second, Barry Cooper, and
the later cases, did not discuss the use of the FTC Act violation as an incentive because
the HOEPA violation was clear in those cases. 212 The HOEPA arguments needed no
boost. Finally, this Note's use of an incentives argument requires less of a stretch in
statutory definitions than the use in Barry Cooper. While in Barry Cooper the HOEPA
violation covered for a deficiency in the unfairness argument, no such deficiency exists
in my HOEPA argument. Unsecured credit payoffs fit into the four-part statutory
definition of a finance charge. 213 The use of the FTC Act violation provides a
supplemental policy incentive; even without this policy claim, a court could fit
unsecured credit payoffs into HOEPA.

CONCLUSION

Due to the theoretical connection and the connection in precedent between the FTC
Act and HOEPA, courts can employ the HOEPA framework as an avenue to remedy
the unfairness present in unsecured credit payoffs. Classifying the sum as a finance
charge will significantly increase the chance that the borrower will enjoy HOEPA's
substantive protections. Importantly, remedying this credit practice within the HOEPA
framework does not stretch the boundaries of the statute at all-the practice fits neatly in
the definition of a finance charge. By applying the HOEPA framework to unsecured
credit payoffs, courts can provide relief to borrowers facing unremedied FTC Act
unfairness.

211. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
212. Prepayment penalties are explicitly prohibited in HOEPA-qualifying loans. 12
C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(6) (2003).
213. See supra notes 174-91 and accompanying text.

